Multi-functional design problems are characterized by strong coupling between design variables that are controlled by stakeholders from different disciplines. This coupling necessitates efficient modeling of interactions between multiple designers who want to achieve conflicting objectives but share control over design variables. Various game-theoretic protocols such as cooperative, non-cooperative, and leader/follower have been used to model interactions between designers. Non-cooperative game theory protocols are of particular interest for modeling cooperation in multi-functional design problems. These are the focus of this paper because they more closely reflect the level of information exchange possible in a distributed environment. Two strategies for solving such non-cooperative game theory problems are -a) passing Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) among designers and combining these to find points of intersection and b) exchanging single points in the design space iteratively until the solution converges to a single point. While the first strategy is computationally expensive because it requires each designer to consider all possible outcomes of decisions made by other designers, the second strategy may result in divergence of the solution.
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FRAME OF REFERENCE -DECENTRALIZED DECISION MAKING IN DESIGN
Imagine a complex design scenario such as the design of a multi-functional, multi-scale product/material system with numerous, conflicting requirements. One of the characteristics of such a multi-functional design problem is that experts from different domains must work together both in a serial and parallel fashion in order to achieve their individual as well as overarching system level goals. For example, the product may be required to simultaneously meet structural and thermal requirements, while satisfying geometric constraints. It is in this regard that experts from relevant domains (i.e., structural, thermal, manufacturing, etc.) are called upon; they are required to contribute their respective expertise and collaborate in order to accomplish their individual and common goals. In multifunctional design scenarios such as this, effectiveness of collaboration between designers is the key to success. The problem of choosing a method for effective collaboration is essentially that of finding the most appropriate way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among domain experts, subject to organizational barriers and process dynamics.
Depending on the nature of the underlying design process, there are two collaboration strategies that are commonly employed for effectively synthesizing contributions of interacting designers. The first strategy is based on centralized decision-making and requires a single transfer of knowledge from various domain experts to a central decision-maker. It is based on gathering and consolidating information and facilitates the attainment of Pareto-optimal solutions via simultaneous consideration of system level tradeoffs. However, even slight changes in any of the design goals or requirements pertaining to the integrated domains or the design environment may render the gathered knowledge incomplete; optimal solutions may no longer be obtainable. Specifically, the centralized decisionmaker may not have the required expertise to adjust domain models in order to accommodate the required changes, rendering iteration with other stakeholders unavoidable. Hayek [1] , on the other hand, advocates decentralized decision-making, pointing out that it is important to delegate responsibility to persons "on the spot" who have intimate knowledge of their respective domains and are (consequently) capable of making any required inferences. Lee and Whang [2] present decentralized decision-making methods in the context of supply chains, whereas Chanron and co-authors [3] offer a decentralized decision-making strategy for the solution of engineering design problems.
Decentralized decisions are classified as being either coupled or decoupled in nature. Decoupled decisions are characterized by independence in formulation and solution, thereby allowing a unidirectional (sequential) flow of information and greatly facilitating the underlying design processes. Coupled decisions, on the other hand, are more complex and require a two-way flow of information between decisionmakers as well as active involvement of domain experts throughout the decision-making process. Coupled decisions are especially significant in multi-functional design problems, where different designers and domain experts control a common set of design variables and share responsibility for achieving different objectives. Considering the prevalence of coupled decisions in engineering design in general and within multi-functional design in particular, we present an intervalbased technique for their resolution in this paper. Before proceeding, however, we underscore some of the nuances inherent in the solution of coupled problems as well as current means of resolution at the hand of a simple problem, requiring the interaction of two designers.
Consider the scenario shown in Figure 1 , where Designers A and B are responsible for achieving their respective design objectives. These objectives are defined in terms of the maximization, minimization, or matching of response variables -Y. In the given scenario Designer A controls a set of design variables X A while Designer B controls a set of design variables X B . Since the two decisions are coupled, Designer A cannot make a decision about X A unless the values of X B are fixed. Similarly, Designer B cannot make a determination with regard to X B unless the values of X A are known. One of the strategies commonly implemented for solving such a coupled, decentralized problem is point-based iteration. In point-based iteration interacting designers consider a single point within a given design space at a time and iteratively adjust this point until they converge on a solution that satisfies their respective design objectives (which are functions of response variables). Procedurally, one of the designers (say Designer A in the scenario depicted in Figure 1) Disadvantages of such a point-based iterative method relate to the manner in which a) design freedom is reduced and b) convergence is achieved. The first disadvantage is that design freedom is reduced from the initial ranges of design variables to point values in a single step. This severely limits designers in accommodating any changes in requirements. A more gradual and systematic reduction of the design space and the associated design freedom, on the other hand, reduces premature (unnecessary) elimination of potential solutions. Design freedom, here, is defined as the extent to which a system can be adjusted while still meeting the design requirements posed for it [4] . This is illustrated in Figure 2 . In this figure, a comparison of point-based (see Figure 2a ) and interval-based methods (see Figure 2b ) is presented in terms of a) design space, made up of the design variables under the designers' control ( , Y Y ) and c) the associated design freedom. The numbers on the figure represent successive exchanges among interacting designers and the associated effects on the design space, the response space and the associated design freedom. The arrows in the point-based approach denote the progression of the design process by moving from point to point in the design space. The rectangles in the design and response spaces of the interval-based approach, on the other hand, refer to regions under consideration at given points in time.
In order to more effectively manage design freedom throughout the design process, a number of set-based design techniques have been proposed for application in design [5] [6] [7] . The primary reasons for using such set-based design methods are (1) the communication of sets of possibilities and (2) the subsequent narrowing of these sets, balancing the need to gain more knowledge and progressively reduce uncertainty [7] . These sets of possibilities are represented by a series of rectangles, the areas of which decrease with successive iterations, in Figure 2 . As shown, the reduction in design freedom for point based methods occurs in a single step, whereas that associated with interval-based methods is more gradual. An additional advantage, particular to set-based methods is the ability to make simultaneous progress on interdependent design problems and increase their concurrency, without reformulating them as a single design problem. In this paper, we build on the concept of set-based design through the implementation of interval arithmetic. Instead of communicating information about a single point in the design space at a time, we advocate the transfer of feasible ranges of values for given design variables. The key advantage of such an interaction mechanism is that design freedom remains open for a longer period of time, thereby accommodating changes in the requirements during the execution of the design process and maintaining the autonomy of experts over their respective domains. Interval arithmetic has been used for modeling selection decisions [8] .
The second limitation of point-based methods is that the resulting solutions may be unstable. Additionally, results may never converge to the problem's Nash equilibrium. Chanron and co-authors [3, 9, 10] investigate the underlying dynamics of decentralized processes and corresponding convergence and stability criteria using numerical series and linear algebra. Their investigation, however, is based on the assumption that the system has previously been decomposed. Consequently, Chanron and co-authors do not investigate the effect of decomposition strategies on convergence. In this paper, we illustrate the effect of different decomposition strategies on problem convergence characteristics and offer mathematical criteria for system decomposition.
In summary, we present a design method that aids system level designers in executing design processes of multi-functional product/material systems, where designers in charge of different functional requirements share a common set of design variables. Using this method, design freedom is reduced only when eliminating infeasible ranges of a design space, thereby accommodating unforeseen changes in design objectives over time. The key advantages of this method are that a) the resulting, decomposed system never diverges and b) design freedom is reduced systematically (though not prematurely) throughout the design process. With this in mind, we provide an overview of non-cooperative game theoretic protocols for modeling interactions between designers in Section 2. We also present the principle of Box Consistency -a mathematical tool emanating from Interval Arithmetic -which serves as a foundation for the proposed interval-based focalization method. We proceed to outline our method for multi-functional design in Section 3 and illustrate this method with a non-linear, multifunctional design example in Section 4. The convergence characteristics of this method are described in Section 5. Finally, we provide a discussion with regard to current limitations of the proposed method and future opportunities for extension in Section 6.
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS USED IN THIS PAPER
There are a number of different mechanisms commonly employed for decentralized decision-making in multi-functional design problems. These include applications of multi-disciplinary optimization approaches (e.g., [11] ), negotiations (e.g., [12] [13] [14] ), and finally game theoretic principles (e.g., [15] [16] [17] [18] ). Since game theory has been formalized for both centralized and de-centralized decision-making, we build on the underlying protocols to develop the interval-based focalization method proposed in this paper. An overview of game-theory as applied within the field of engineering design is provided in Section 2.1, with an emphasis on the non-cooperative formulation that appropriately represents coupled, decentralized decision-making. In order to develop the solution mechanism for this problem formulation, we rely on Box Consistency, a mathematical construct developed within the area of interval arithmetic. A detailed discussion of Box Consistency follows in Section 2.2.
Game Theory Protocols for Collaborative
Design Game theory has been employed as a means of conflict resolution in engineering design, with instantiations varying depending on the nature of the underlying problem addressed. Myerson [19] , for example, presents game theory as a method for resolving conflict between multiple decision-makers controlling subsets of design variables and striving to minimize individual cost functions. Rao and Freiheit [20] present a modified game theory method to solve multi-objective problems, that is subsequently extended by Rao [15] for structural optimization and by Badhrinath and Rao [21] for the integrated design of control structure. Hacker and Lewis [22] develop a robust design method to reduce elements of uncertainty in a non-cooperative system that result from prediction of disciplinary subsystem behavior. This uncertainty is due predominantly to a lack of global control. Unknown and uncontrollable design decisions (made within competing subsystems) are thus modeled as internal noise variables via the application of robust design in conjunction with game theoretic protocols. The goal is to reduce the effect of interacting decision-makers on one another. Subsequently, Kalsi, Hacker, and Lewis [23] proceed to build upon this framework by solving disciplinary sub-problems independently from the rest of the system through the incorporation of ranges. Changes in control variables are also considered explicitly, thereby including Type II Robust Design (i.e., robustness to variability in design parameters) principles. Hernández implements game theoretic principles to establish a mathematically supported cooperative framework that enhances the practical, effective, and efficient integration of the enterprise design process [24] . Specifically, Hernández provides a method, appropriate for the formulation and solution of design problems in a manner consistent with this framework, where enterprise decisions are coordinated through a design formulation based on the game theoretical formulation of the enterprise design process. In later work Hernández [25, 26] formalizes the interactions of two collaborating stakeholders in engineering design processes. Marston [16, 27] develops a multi-designer model of engineering design that accounts for uncertainty, cooperation, non-cooperation, and coalitions, using the mathematics of decision and game theory. In doing so he introduces the notion of Game-Based Design as, "…the set of mathematically complete principles of rational behavior for designers in any design scenario" [28] .
Lewis and Mistree [17] abstract the mathematical foundations of game theory to model complex design processes. They model the strategic relationships among designers sharing a common design space using game theoretic principles and identify Pareto Cooperation, Stackelberg Leader/Follower, and Nash Non-Cooperation as the three game theoretic protocols most representative of the interactions required for decentralized design. Pareto Cooperation is employed to represent centralized decision making, where all required information is available to every collaborating designer. A Pareto optimal solution is achieved when no single designer can improve his or her performance without negatively affecting that of another. Stackelberg Leader/ Follower protocols are implemented to model sequential decision making processes where the "leader" makes his or her decision, based on the assumption that the "follower" will behave rationally. The follower then makes his or her decision within the constraints emanating form the leader's choice.
Nash Non-Cooperation refers to decentralized decision processes where designers have to make decisions in isolation due to organizational barriers, time schedules, and geographical constraints. It is focused on formulation of strategies that "rational" individuals follow when their actions and objectives are affected by others, its mathematical models are suitable for formulating decisions in collaborative design [26] . The Nash Non-Cooperative protocol is particularly important in multifunctional design scenarios because the collocation of design experts and extensive coupling within the design space are not required.
In Nash Non-Cooperative protocols, decision-makers formulate Rational Reaction Sets (RRS) or Best Reply Correspondences (BRC). A RRS is a mapping (either a mathematical or a fitted function) that relates the values of design variables under a designer's control to values of design variables controlled by other stakeholders. For example, in a two designer scenario where the first designer controls design variable set A X and the second designer controls variable set B X , the RRSs of the first designer is given by
and the RRS of second designer is given by
In order to calculate the RRS explicitly, a designer assumes the set of values for design variables not within their control and chooses values of his/her own design variables in order to maximize his/her own payoff. Since the evaluation of the RRS is a computationally expensive process, the function is evaluated at discrete points and a response surface model (or similar approximation technique) is employed to derive an explicit functional form of the RRSs. This process is prone to approximation errors that can be attributed to poor fidelity and loworder functional fit.
The Nash Non-Cooperative solution to the coupled, decentralized decision-making problem is the point of intersection of the RRSs pertaining to the different designers. The resulting Nash equilibrium to the design problem has the characteristic that no designer can improve unilaterally his/her objective function [29] . The Nash equilibrium thus ensures that each decision-maker's strategy constitutes an optimal response to other decision-makers' strategies. The approach commonly adopted for solving Nash Non-Cooperative decision-making problems is explicitly calculating the various RRSs and then finding their intersection. This method represents the use of game theory as a solution algorithm, rather than a communications protocol. Hence, this solution method does not reflect the actual manner in which decisions are made by designers in a decentralized design process. Another solution technique for solving Nash Non-Cooperative design problems involves making decisions iteratively where one designer starts with assumed values for other designers' design variables and makes a decision about his/her own design variables. Other designers use these values in an iterative fashion and determine the values for their design variables under their control. The process continues until the solution converges to the Nash Equilibrium.
Although this solution approach more closely resembles the interactions associated with decentralized decision-making, convergence and stability are not guaranteed (as discussed in Section 1). In order to overcome these respective shortcomings, we offer an alternative game theoretic mechanism for noncooperative conflict resolution in Section 3.
Box Consistency
Box Consistency is a concept stemming from interval arithmetic that is focused on checking the consistency of each equation in a system in order to eliminate sub-boxes of a given box that cannot contain the solution to the system [30] . We implement this construct to successively eliminate those areas of a given design space that do not contain the Nash Equilibrium of the system. Box Consistency constitutes a systematic means of reducing a shared design space that lends itself to turn-based decision making, where each designer sequentially eliminates the unacceptable regions of the design space. Since Box Consistency also allows us to embody the propagation of ranged sets of specifications among interacting stakeholders, it is quite suitable as a solution algorithm for coupled, decentralized multifunctional decision-making. Mathematically, Box Consistency can be defined as illustrated by the following example.
Consider The notion of consistency when extended to higher dimensional spaces translates to Box Consistency. This consistency principle is illustrating in Figure 3 using two straight lines, 
Figure 3 -Illustration of Consistency
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y Y ∈ must be box-consistent with respect to both functions 1 f and 2 f . For the set of linear equations shown in Figure 3 , the interval that is box consistent with respect to both functions is thus a single point, specifically the intersection of the two lines making up the system. The same idea is applicable not just for linear functions but for any type of nonlinear function. In order to find the box that is consistent with both 1 f and 2 f , a sufficiently large box is chosen and its size is reduced systematically by considering one function at a time until Box Consistency is achieved for all of the functions considered. Assuming that for a subset s X within the interval X, there are no corresponding values in the interval Y that satisfy the consistency condition, the subset s X can be excluded because it does not contain the solution. This strategy of systematic reduction of box size is incorporated in the interval-based focalization method for decentralized decision-making presented in this paper and forms the basis for the associated systematic reduction of design freedom. In the next section, we proceed to outline the proposed method and illustrate its application for simple cases.
AN INTERVAL-BASED FOCALIZATION METHOD FOR DECENTRALIZED MULTIFUNCTIONAL DESIGN
Consider a design problem which is characterized by a set of responses that are associated with different domains. These responses are functions of a common set of design variables, control over which is shared among interacting designers. Hence, coupling is induced, satisfaction of designer objectives is interlinked, and a means of conflict resolution is required. In such scenarios, required interactions among designers are often modeled using principles taken from non-cooperative game theory. Two such approaches in the literature, which are adopted for executing coupled decisions, center on the explicit calculation of RRS intersections and iterative turn-based resolution as explored by Chanron and co-authors [3, 9, 10] .
Both approaches are based on the assumption that different designers control subsets of a common set of design variables and are responsible for satisfying different (and often conflicting) objectives. The first approach involves finding the Nash equilibrium by solving the resulting system of RRS equations explicitly relying on either analytical or numerical techniques. A primary disadvantage of this approach is the computational intensity of RRS evaluation. The second approach centers on iteratively searching the design space for a mutually acceptable solution. Disadvantages of this approach are that iterations may not converge to the equilibrium point and resulting solutions are very sensitive to the initial values chosen for design variables.
In light of these considerations, we propose an alternative interval-based focalization method where designer communications are based on ranges of design variables rather than point values. The designers start with a design space, defined by ranges for each design variable as specified by the domain experts, assigned control over the specific domains. The interacting decision-makers subsequently proceed to take turns in making decisions about their respective decision variables and progressively reduce the intervals systematically until either a sufficient degree of convergence is achieved or all design objectives can be satisfied successfully. This method differs from sequential methods in so far as entire ranges of values (rather than point values) are considered in any given cycle, offering a distinct advantage with regard to changes in objectives and design considerations.
To illustrate this point, assume that N designers are involved in a multifunctional design problem, sharing a common design space defined by a set of design variables vij (where i ranges from 1 to N, j ranges from 1 to m, and m is the number of design variables controlled by a single designer). This scenario is illustrated in Figure 4 . The circle at the center represents the number of design variables. These design variables are partitioned into mutually exclusive sets Vi. For example, Designer 1 has control over sets of design variables V1 = {v11, v12, …, v1m}. The arrows in the figure represent the passing of intervals of design variables throughout the design process. As shown in the figure, designers make decisions about their design variables cyclically. A designer is in the active state if it is his/her turn to make a decision. All other designers are in the inactive state. At a given point in time, only one designer is in the active state, while all remaining designers passively observe. A full cycle of the proposed interval-based focalization method is completed once all of the interacting designers have made a decision, successively reducing the available design freedom. The steps of the proposed method are listed in Figure 5 . In the proposed method, we represent designer considerations in terms of compromise Decision Support Problems (DSP), the word formulation for which is provided in Table 1 . During his/her turn, the active designer is presented with a range of values for the design variables controlled by other (inactive) designers. This range represents a set of values within which inactive designers have the freedom (and responsibility) to select any value they choose. This freedom is represented by a double-line arrow in Figure 4 . Given this range, the active designer determines the largest possible range for his/her design variables that will satisfy his/her response, regardless of what values other designers determine for the decision variables under their control. In other words, the active designer identifies the range of his/her design variables that will ensure Box Consistency with respect to his/her RRS. This is achieved by Newton's Interval Method of Elimination of intervals that do not satisfy Box Consistency, [26] . This method requires the identification of lower and upper bounds on unwanted intervals. The ranges of values of design variables from the active designer are passed on in sequence to an inactive designer who then becomes active during his/her turn. The process is repeated in a cyclical fashion until a sufficient degree of convergence is achieved or all design objectives can be successfully satisfied. Often this degree of convergence is attained at a single point.
Having described the method, we proceed to illustrate it with two multifunctional design problems -(1) a scenario with two designers where each designer aims to optimize their responses (see Section 3.1) and (2) a scenario where each designer aims to achieve target values for their responses (see Section 4) . A discussion of effects of initial conditions is presented in Section 3.2.
Example with Linear Rational Reaction Sets
(RRS) In Figure 1, . The responses are related to the design variables as follows: The surface plots for these functions are shown in Figure 6 . Designer A is responsible for minimizing his/her objective given by the response A Y , whereas Designer B is charged with maximizing B Y . Given that the control is as described, the designers' best response is given by the following equations that also represent the designers' respective RRSs: . This concludes the first cycle in the intervalbased design process. The design spaces resulting from subse-quent reductions in the ranges considered by Designers A and B are shown in Figure 8a and 7b respectively.
The sequential range reduction cycles continue until the ranges of A X and B X converge to a point. The ranges of design variables after successive cycles are provided in Table 2 , a result one might expect based upon the intersection of the designers' respective RRSs. 
The Effect of Initial Conditions
A prerequisite initial condition for application of this method is that the starting ranges for variables controlled by both designs are such that it is possible for the active designer to find a value for his/her design variables (satisfying his/her objectives) for all values of design variables controlled by inactive designers. For example in the two-designer scenario, for any value in the range of B X , Designer A should be able to Two important characteristics of this method arei) The design space considered in cycle (i+1) is always smaller than or equal to the design space in cycle (i).
ii) If the initial condition is satisfied, all future cycles will also satisfy this condition. The key advantages of this method are a) if the initial condition (mentioned above) is met, the process will never diverge and b) there is a gradual reduction of the design space during the process. This means that there is a range of responses that can be satisfied after any given cycle. Hence, limited changes in design objectives can be accommodated without re-executing the design process in its entirety (i.e., without repeating the preceding design cycles). This remains true as long as the updated design objectives can be satisfied by a point in the design space corresponding to the current design cycle. 
a) Designer A's RRS (
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE FOR OBJECTIVE TARGET MATCHING -LINEAR CELLULAR ALLOY DESIGN
In this section, we focus on an example centered on multifunctional design of Linear Cellular Alloys (LCA) [31, 32] in order to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed intervalbased focalization method for complex non-linear problems, where the designers' aim to achieve target values of their respective objectives. This stands in marked contrast to the example presented in Section 3.1, where each designer was interested in maximizing/minimizing their objectives. Linear Cellular Alloys are honeycomb materials (see Figure 9 ) that are produced via the extrusion of a ceramic slurry through a multistage die. The slurry is composed of a binder mixed with metal oxide powders. The structure resulting from the extrusion is first dried and reduced into the metallic phase in a hydrogen rich environment. It is then sintered to produce nearly fully dense metal composites. A wide range of cell sizes and shapes including functionally graded structures can be achieved using this manufacturing process. The resulting materials are especially suitable for multi-functional applications that require both strength and heat transfer capabilities [33] . Applications of these materials include heat sinks for microprocessors and combustor liners for aircraft engines. One of the main advantages of these LCAs is that desired structural and thermal properties can be obtained by designing the cell shape, cell arrangement, and cell wall thicknesses, as well as, dimensioning the overall LCA structure. Consider a scenario where a multi-functional LCA is to be designed with the following behavioral attributes - The results obtained by applying the proposed intervalbased focalization method (see Figure 5 ) are presented in Table 3 . In this table, the ranges of design variables (overall height and wall thickness) after each successive cycle are presented. The gradual reduction of the design space along the design process is plotted in Figure 11 . This example shows that the proposed method can be applied to non-linear problems as well. It is important to note that after each cycle, the achievable target values for compliance and overall heat transfer are also ranges. In this case, the criteria governing convergence are the following -successive intervals of each design variable must be proper subsets of intervals determined during previous cycles. This is mathematically represented as: . Continuing this process does not result in convergent behavior, underscoring the fact that the assignment of control over design variables to different designers indeed has an effect on the convergence of the underlying process. However, in contrast with the pointbased methods discussed in Section 1, the designers are able to identify in a single cycle whether the solution will converge. In a point-based method, divergence would not have been obvious and continued iteration would have been required. However, foundational work in this direction is being carried out by Chanron, Lewis and co-authors [3, 9, 10] , who have developed general convergence criteria for n-designers with quadratic RRSs. The benefit of developing convergence criteria for interval based methods is that the criteria serve as a guide for appropriate partitioning of the design variable set into subsets assigned to designers.
Based on this simple example, it becomes apparent that there is a need to develop a criterion for convergence of the interval-based focalization method. The method will converge if the range of design variables at cycle (i+1) is a subset of the range of design variables at cycle i. In other words, when the design space is effectively reduced after each cycle. The nota- 
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A A X X < < . This effectively means that the starting ranges of A X and B X do not affect convergence of the solution. This is in contrast to the point-based iterative method [9] , where the choice of starting points directly affects convergence. In the scenario where design variable control is reversed, the convergence criteria are: 
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A A X X > > . Obviously, this is not possible, since the minima in each range exceed the maxima. Based on the convergence criterion, it is clear that this design process will not and, in fact, cannot converge. This underscores that different partitioning schemes may not only lead to different answers but may also change the convergence characteristics underlying a design problem. We thus assert that the proposed convergence criterion can be used as a basis for the assignment of design variable control to different designers. This is the next issue we plan to explore in developing the proposed interval-based focalization method further.
In the case of multiple Nash equilibria, convergence to a point solution may be impeded. This means that the size of the box may remain constant from one cycle to the next. Consider the case of two designers with RRSs intersecting more than once, as shown in Figure 14 (a). After several reductions of the design space using the proposed interval-based focalization method, the region containing possible solutions is reduced to rectangle ABCD. Clearly, subsequent cycles will not reduce the design space further. A possible solution to this problem is to partition the design space into subsets (e.g., rectangles AEFD and EBCF in Figure 14(b) ) to which the focalization method is then applied in parallel. The result of one post partition cycle is shown in Figure 14 (c).
CLOSURE
In this paper, we present an interval-based focalization method for facilitating interactions, modeled using non-cooperative game theoretic protocols, as commonly employed for conflict resolution in decentralized, multifunctional design scenarios, involving shared control over design variables. This method is based on the Box Consistency principle, developed in the area of interval arithmetic. Key advantages of adopting the proposed method include non-divergence of solutions to coupled design problems, insensitivity of convergence characteristics to starting ranges, and gradual reduction of design freedom, prolonging adaptability to design changes.
The proposed method is illustrated with of two examples. Specifically, we solve a non-cooperative game, centered on the intersection of linear RRSs, in the first example (a set of quadratic equations) and underscore the influence of control assignment on convergence. Application of the method to cases where RRSs are non-linear is demonstrated in the second example (LCA design). 
Further development of this method is centered on investigating cases where -a) designers have additional, local design variables that are not shared, but depend on the values of shared parameters, b) design variables are defined on discontinuous or piece-wise defined intervals, and c) multiple non-cooperative solutions (Nash equilibrium) exist. Other considerations include scalability of the method to cases characterized by more than two designers each in charge of multiple design variables. The impact of designer sequencing on convergence and its rate, as well as comparison to other collaborative optimization approaches deserves more detailed consideration.
